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unirtm Supply Chain Security Analysis ​

Overview ​

This document analyzes the supply chain risks associated with unirtm's default registry and provides mitigation strategies.

Risk Analysis ​

1. Implicit Registry Redirection ​

Risk: unirtm's built-in registry can silently redirect tool installations to different backends.

Example:

toml
# You specify:
"github:checkmake/checkmake" = "v0.3.2"

# But unirtm's registry maps 'checkmake' to:
aqua:mrtazz/checkmake

Impact:

  • Different maintainer (mrtazz vs checkmake organization)
  • Additional layer (aqua registry) increases attack surface
  • Potential for supply chain attacks if registry is comprounirtmd

2. Affected Tools in This Project ​

Based on unirtm registry inspection, the following tools have registry mappings:

bash
checkmake                     aqua:mrtazz/checkmake
gitleaks                      aqua:gitleaks/gitleaks
hadolint                      aqua:hadolint/hadolint

Mitigation Strategies ​

✅ Already Implemented ​

  1. Explicit Backend Specification: All tools in .unirtm.toml use explicit backends:

    • github:owner/repo for GitHub releases
    • npm:package for npm packages
    • pipx:package for Python packages
  2. Tool Spec Mapping: In scripts/lib/lint-wrapper.sh, we explicitly map tool names to full specs:

    bash
    checkmake)
      _UNIRTM_TOOL_SPEC="github:checkmake/checkmake"
      _LINTER_BIN="checkmake"
      ;;
  3. Version Pinning: All tools are pinned to specific versions in .unirtm.toml

🔒 Additional Recommendations ​

1. Disable unirtm Registry (Future) ​

When unirtm supports it, consider disabling the default registry:

toml
[settings]
disable_default_registry = true  # Not yet supported

2. Audit Tool Sources ​

Regularly verify that installed tools match expected sources:

bash
# Check what unirtm actually installed
unirtm list

# Verify binary checksums against official releases
unirtm exec -- <tool> --version

3. Use unirtm.lock for Reproducibility ​

The unirtm.lock file ensures consistent installations across environments:

bash
# Verify lock file matches configuration
unirtm install --frozen

4. Monitor unirtm Registry Changes ​

Watch for changes in unirtm's registry that might affect your tools:

bash
# Check current registry mappings
unirtm registry | grep -E "(checkmake|gitleaks|hadolint)"

Verification Steps ​

Before Deployment ​

  1. Verify Tool Sources:

    bash
    unirtm list | grep -v "npm:" | grep -v "pipx:"
  2. Check for Unexpected Backends:

    bash
    unirtm list | grep "aqua:"

    Should only show tools you explicitly configured with aqua backend.

  3. Validate Binary Integrity:

    bash
    # For GitHub releases, verify against official checksums
    unirtm where github:checkmake/checkmake
    sha256sum $(unirtm where github:checkmake/checkmake)/bin/checkmake

During CI/CD ​

Our CI workflows already implement:

  • ✅ Locked unirtm versions (UNIRTM_LOCKED=1)
  • ✅ Explicit tool specs in lint-wrapper.sh
  • ✅ Version pinning in .unirtm.toml
  • ✅ unirtm.lock committed to repository
  1. Dependabot: Monitors unirtm tool versions
  2. Trivy: Scans for vulnerabilities in binaries
  3. SBOM Generation: Documents all tool dependencies
  4. Signed Commits: Ensures code integrity

References ​

Action Items ​

  • [ ] Monitor unirtm for registry disable feature
  • [ ] Set up automated alerts for registry changes
  • [ ] Document tool source verification in CI
  • [ ] Consider contributing to unirtm for better registry transparency

Last Updated: 2026-04-16 Reviewed By: Security Team Next Review: 2026-07-16

Released under the MIT License.